On Age Verification

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The below text is an opinion of mine, one where I try to back up with some sources, but ultimately it’s mainly an expression of what I believe is right. Try to understand it, challenge it, confront it with what you know, check sources, read, find more on the topics, let the text here be just a spark, a start, not the end for what will ultimately be your opinion on the topic.

Privacy is in vogue. In today’s digital world it became almost like a trend, for better or worse.

And on the Internet it’s almost impossible to talk about Age Verification without talking about privacy. For a good reason many fear Age Verification because existing methods of verifying age will lead to oopsies. The thing however, is that privacy is only one element of the puzzle, and if we don’t talk about the problem from other problematic perspectives we risk losing everything that loss of privacy would have caused anyway.

Age Verification

I’ll spare you the details of history of Age Verification on the Internet and explaining how it is being implemented. I wrote a blog post in Polish about it, and I’m not planning on translating it. Here I want to focus on why I believe most of the creatures discussing this topic on Fediverse and elsewhere seem to be missing the point of Age Verification regulations.

To define the main problem — I’ll be referring to all methods that restrict access to some content on the Internet and verification solutions built with aim of excluding a group of users based on their perceived or documented age as Age Verification. This includes terms such as Age Assurance or Identity Verification.

It’s a stepping stone

There are various politicians, organizations, some even fighting for digital rights, who argue that mandatory Age Verification for accessing social media websites, pornographic content or even other kinds of websites with User Generated Content is a necessary step at protecting children from evils of digital world. Oftentimes, those parties even admit that the effectiveness of those methods is flaky at best, and young creatures find a way to get in anyways, but it’s all good because as long as it stops 10% of children this is already an improvement.

They often say that those regulations are just the beginning and more will follow to protect children. That this is sensible temporary measure before bigger guns in law will take down the bad Big Tech and then the children will finally be safe.

Through my adventures in IT I’ve learned one idea that stuck with me — There is Nothing So Permanent as a Temporary Solution. Age Verification on the Internet is not efficient, rarely anyone even questions if we really have solid evidence based in scientific research that this solution will help address the supposed problems12. And yet it’s easier to accept it if we present it as a “stepping stone” as something “temporary” before we actually start doing something meaningful. We might acknowledge that the solution to problems we make up is actually kind of shit, but don’t worry, we will find something better soon pinky promise.

This approach is egregious because the proposed solution raises serious concerns in fields of privacy, freedom, free speech, equality and access to information. It’s not even a question whether ends justify the means, if we don’t have evidence that ends will be met. It’s a lose-lose situation where the only viable output is harm coming in form of loss of rights.

Regulating Age Verification systems themselves is admitting defeat

Stop killing the Internet has created its own European Initiative under the name “Stop Killing The Internet: No Digital ID & No Age Verification” calling on “the European Commission to propose legislation ensuring that digital identity and age-assurance systems used to access online services in the Union remain voluntary, privacy-preserving and non-discriminatory. Citizens must not be forced to identify themselves to access lawful online content or services unless strictly necessary, proportionate and provided by law.” Further, the creators of the initiative sent the following to the European Union as their goal:

‘call on the European Commission to propose legislation ensuring that legal speech, especially one communicated by the means of digital identity and age-assurance systems used to access online services in the Union remain voluntary, privacy-preserving and non-discriminatory’. The organisers consider that citizens ‘must not be forced to identify themselves to access lawful online content or services unless strictly necessary, proportionate and provided by law. The legislation should require anonymous or pseudonymous proof-of-age, data minimisation, selective disclosure, open-source implementation, independent security audits, prohibition of cross-service tracking by relying parties, and equivalent alternatives for citizens who do not use a digital wallet’

To me one thing stuck from the text — it does not disavow Age Verification. I looked at the name of initiative again, it says “No Age Verification” in the darn title. And yet, the Annex does not actually support the slogan/title. This was a first major red flag.

Reading into it, to many this goal may still sound sensible, it calls upon many generally desirable things — proportionality, anonymity, data minimization, open-source implementation, security audits, prohibition of tracking, alternatives. All of those to be implemented in “age-assurance systems used to access online services”. The devil is in the details, however.

When you look at EU Commission developed EU Wallet, a lot of those “desirable traits” are supposedly already built in the design (experts will disagree just how strong those assurances actually are)3456. So in many ways the initiative is largely giving a thumbs up to a solution already being built, if it gathers required amount of signatures, I expect it to be used as political approval of framework EU Commission is already building.

And then there is magical word “voluntary”, the systems are supposed to remain voluntary. It was a head-scratcher for me, what it means for a Age Verification system to remain voluntary. I wondered if someone else figured it out and they did. Nicola Fabiano wrote a very good explanation for what initiative creators might be wanting to achieve with this phrasing, and what “voluntary” means7, in short — it means nothing. Because in EU the EU wallet will likely be one if not the only most private choice for Age Verification, it being voluntary with Age Verification still being a required gate to be passed it makes it de-facto not voluntary for those wishing to preserve their anonymity.

You see, the initiative creators need to create actionable goals for EU institutions to follow assuming the initiative succeeds. In other words, the EU must have a mandate under law to pass some piece of legislature so that initiative has any reason to be sent to EU institutions.

If I were to advocate for best possible age assurance/verification systems, if I would want to make sure they are only where they need to be and exist with protection of my data I’d sign the initiative within a heartbeat. Identity verification is already a thing on the Internet. Know Your Customer laws are enforced in financial institutions across EU because of EU laws. If you plan to have a web domain with .eu as its top-level TLD your legal information will be verified and you might be asked to prove the information is correct8. Whatever initiative wants to achieve, it cannot be “no Identity Verification on the Internet”, because it already is mandated in EU for some circumstances and there is a fat chance of it getting repealed.

So the initiative creators likely went with next best thing — mandate doing the verification only if it’s “voluntary”, “proportionate” and “strictly necessary”. Who defines when it is? The very same creatures introducing the idea of Age Verification across the Internet.

What the initiative creators might hope for is to come to European Parliament (like they did with Stop Killing Games initiative) and argue for their cause, but we saw how that went.

I truthfully believe that the only advocacy regarding issues of age/identity verification on the Internet we need, is one that rejects those mechanisms in their entirety for non-financial institutions. And here is why.

Problems with Age Verification

Age Verification discriminates

Look at current methods of verifying on popular chat platform Discord9:

1. Video selfie via k-ID is processed entirely on-device — the video is deleted immediately, and Discord receives only an estimated age. 2. ID scan pairs a government-issued ID with a selfie through a vendor flow. 3. Google Wallet users can share a passport ID pass; Google sends Discord a birthdate, and Discord derives age from it without retaining that date. 4. Credit card details pass through k-ID and Stripe; Discord states it does not retain card information, and any verification charge is refunded if applied.

First one sounds like most private of them all, it also works within the field of age assurance. This technology estimates user’s age based on their biometric qualities — meaning face. Those models however most are often trained on masculine faces of creatures with white skin coloration. What this means is that they often discriminate by being less accurate for black people and women10. They are also completely clueless when you have any kind of medical conditions that change the look of your face11 or simply have a tattoo12.

And other alternatives often have other huge issues such as privacy problems (any kind of identity verification) or are simply discriminating based on requiring some kind of ID. This is also a problem with European Union’s upcoming European Digital Identity which will limit this verification option to EU citizens who are able to gain access to such a wallet, excluding those with lesser technical literacy, migrants or even tourists, whose location will be tracked to EU country location. In addition, EU wallet applications will mandate hardware-bound attestation, or in less technical, a lot more simplified terms — it will restrict what kind of software/operating system you can use for device you use to verify yourself, effectively excluding creatures who are not running Android or Apple based systems.

Age Verification censors

Age Verification is a tool for censorship and limiting access to information too13. This is what minorities are communicating. LGBTQ+ communities especially are under risk14. When any kind of LGBTQ+ resource is considered sexual, it becomes a valid target for limiting based on age. And our resources are rapidly considered as such by automated systems and conservative moderators, even if they are utterly devoid of references to sexuality.

This is to already completely ignore the fact that information on sexuality, reproductive rights and gender identity is essential for proper development of youth and should be part of curriculum15, and therefore be as accessible as possible.

There is a lot of understandable fear that those regulations will take away vital support groups for youth.

Age Verification kills smaller websites

Many proposed regulations imposing Age Verification require their enforcement on any Internet platform operating in given country. While not the case in Australia, where only chosen platforms are being held accountable for enforcement of those regulations, UK and US states take broader view on who is affected. This leads to smaller platforms, even non-profit ones or those operating on small budget to be affected16.

Compliance with those regulations always is associated with additional cost on side of website operator, cost which often is life or death for those platforms.

For example, frisk.space (website you are reading this blog post on) does have some sexually explicit content here and there. I operate this website with basically no budget on hobbyist basis. If I were required to implement Age Verification three things will happen first — I’d have to most likely pay for access to age-verification solutions from one of the private companies that sell such verification methods, second — I’d have to somehow introduce access control to some of my website, which is a ridiculous concept for a public, static website where I put my work, third — nobody would care to spend time verifying for a small independent website with few blog posts and few pages with sexually explicit descriptions.

Requiring websites like this one to comply with those regulations is death for self-expression on the Internet, and it only serves large platforms with budget which allows them to fight any claim of non-compliance as well as costs of compliance itself.

Age Verification will escalate

Do you know the “First They Came” poem? This is exactly how I see the conversation on Age Verification going now and in the future.

I remember few years ago the only context with which the idea of verifying your age on the Internet was associated with, was restricting access to pornography websites. Many used baseless arguments claiming they are destructive to children, often citing simply how accessible they are and that they are visited by underage creatures, slowly stoking the fire under next cauldron of moral panic. Few years later Age Verification discussion went in full force in context of restricting youth from accessing social media websites.

I observed this very escalation with organization I support — Polish NGO Panoptykon (organization fighting for digital freedom and privacy(sic)) which in April of 2025 expressed open disapproval of age gating any website other than pornographic websites (specifically mentioning social media platforms in the same post)17. A year later the same organization started lobbying for age gating social media websites1819.

This is troubling development, but it’s not exclusive to a single Polish NGO. Polish politicians since have floated the idea of using same enforcement methods against other types of websites on the Internet. I have no doubt in my mind, that the same regulations restricting pornography and social media will be used in the future by politicians to restrict more types of content and Internet websites based on then current political climate. The infrastructure supporting this as well as legal framework for enforcing it will already be there.

And it’s not only about what will be restricted, but also how. In the USA a new model is emerging where Age Verification has to be done on operating system level leading to operating system having to either verify age or ask for one on initial setup, and sending that age to Internet platforms whenever they ask20.

This escalation might eventually lead to greater control over computing in general by the governments.

Age Verification changes Internet’s social contract

To me, Age Verification presents a significantly different model for the Internet. It shifts information being accessible to more siloed Internet where anonymity is not expected at all, and authorization is required for information access on almost all levels. While in today’s ad fueled dystopia it’s questionable whether anonymity is even still part of Internet model, Age Verification answers this question with resounding no.

This is closely related to concept of “Overton window”. As Internet becomes more and more hostile to concepts such as privacy and anonymity (which in large part functioned pretty well after Internet escaped academics and before it hit its data-driven nightmare it is today) we are getting used to giving our information away in exchange for free services from commercial entities. Many of us nowadays use arguments such as “they know everything about me anyways, there is no point to sacrifice convenance for privacy” and I believe those attitudes were shaped exactly by the Internet giants getting us cozy and dependent on their solutions, taming us, baiting us with promise of efficiency and comfort.

Age Verification is yet another cog in the machine, that will shift how we think about the Internet and what we find acceptable. By regulating from position of the government, we will get used to new reality where access to information and communication is granted after we provide some biometric or identity data to the service. When the Overton window is shifted, and we choose to see that new Internet as what is and should be, what will be the next change to Internet social contract? I suggest looking at China, where legal identity is already closely tied to many online services. You might not like what you see21.

Age Verification is a human rights issue

Even if Age Verification methods were effective (which they aren’t), the goal of enforcing them is dubious for yet another important reason. Ultimately undeniable fact is that its purpose is to limit the freedoms of specific class of creatures based on their age. When this happens, we need to approach the topic with extreme caution and make sure we are not infringing on basic human rights.

We allow limiting of some freedoms in exceptional cases such as purchase of alcohol and other illicit substances which have proved to be harmful, but in cases here it’s about access to information, communication tools and other types of media. Right to “receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers” is enshrined in Universal Declaration of Human Rights22. And I’m not the only one thinking it’s a human rights issue2324.

It is especially blatant human rights issue, when such a large range of websites, topics or media we perceive as harmful and therefore subject to limitation on access.

Age Verification is not a verification of age

Age Verification ultimately does not verify age, but rather it limits access to (something) to those who choose to use one of the methods to verify. I think it’s an important distinction to be made.

A creature of age will weigh their comfort, interest and other personal values before they choose to verify themselves. We cannot think of Age Verification mechanisms exclusively as age restriction mechanism, because they do more than that. They make the content less available, more difficult to access which greatly limits amount of creatures who will see it. This is why getting age-restricted restriction on YouTube video limits the reach of those videos much more than what would happen if magically just the underage audience couldn’t see it.

Do note also that it does not verify age. In the majority of cases it verifies whether user of an account at one point had access to a key that was accepted by one of the verification methods. That’s all it does, there is no magic at play here.

Kids famously used video games to trick age assurance systems25, they used videos recorded by someone else with their face on it26, used platforms that do not follow law on Age Verification instead (often less moderated ones), borrowed parent’s ID or credit card or simply asked an adult to go through the verification for them27. Accounts also can change their owner, and adults can sell or give out accounts with Age Verification passed. Those systems simply fail at their promised goals28. Which is why Age Verification systems do not verify age of the user, and lets not kid ourselves that they do.

There are more proportionate alternatives

I want to be clear, there is no way to prevent risk coming to children in full, 100%. Risk comes with living, and using digital world, platforms on it comes with risk. Not even overprotective parents can fully mitigate risk. Every safety measure we implement is about mitigating it, decreasing chances a dangerous situation will occur. But this is not a cop-out. If we want to protect children, we need to define problems and research them.

A concept of a video game in itself is not addictive, mechanics of a video game can be. In similar vain, the social media platforms in themselves are not harmful, but design of them can greatly increase the possibility of harm. If you want to maximize the profits, your social media website will focus on generating as much as possible of it, usually by captivating you by showing you content that makes you angry so that you interact with it and spend time on the platform seeing all the ads. This will likely make us worse off, and this is exactly what regulations around the world should be focusing on. Regulating harmful designs that harm not only young creatures, but also older ones.

But the solution to our issues is not technological. As the name of certain good podcast on technology goes Tech won’t save us. We need actively supporting, media literate parents who understand phenomenas such as cyberbullying, trolling or other29. We need media literacy in schools, we need sex education so that young creatures can recognize sexual abuse and know who they can turn to ask for help.

And if we needed technical solutions, those already existed in form of various parental controls installed by parents on devices of young creatures. Those are more targeted and proportionate than suggested regulations, but not without their faults too.

To summarize

The main takeaway point of what I’m trying to say, is that privacy is only one of many serious issues with entire concept of introducing Age Verification regulations to the Internet. Age Verification represents a shift in how Internet is being used in western world, and in many ways it is built on the same pillars as other moral panic issues, lacking evidentiary arguments for both effectiveness of Age Verification as well as proving that the problems Age Verification is supposed to solve really are problems requiring our attention. If our advocacy focuses only on privacy aspect, we miss the big picture. If advocacy permits Age Verification assuming it’s “private”, it is ultimately advocacy that will cause harm to the mission of Internet as public resource for public good.

I don’t call for harm reduction of introduced Age Verification mechanisms on the Internet, I call for rejection of them in entirety. This absolutist stance comes from lack of scientific evidence to support existence of assumed problems those methods are supposed to solve as well as how disproportionate those solutions are in solving the assumed problems.

I call upon fellow netizens to oppose any kind of regulations imposing Age Verification requirements on Internet websites, to protect spaces online we cherish and support them to help them with continued existence as AI tax is straining the pockets of many web hosters.

I believe that ultimately Age Verification is not about protecting children, but about control and money. The idea itself is populist opium presenting “easy” solution to complex problem, avoiding telling parents30 to do better and take more responsibility for raising their offspring. Techno-optimism requires us to believe that the solutions to our problems are based in technology, but are they? Big Tech companies are spending a lot of money lobbying for those solutions for one reason or another. With Age Verification we are not regulating Big Tech, but rather everyday creatures and their participation in discourse on the Internet and what can they say.

Resist. Do not obey in advance. Make it as difficult as possible for politicians and lobbyists to control the narrative over Age Verification. Optimally do not use services that implement age-gating, or join events that require you to verify, make sure to let creatures responsible know why you decide not to join their platform or event. If you truthfully need them — circumvent age-gates by any means necessary. If you can, try to host your websites away from countries mandating Age Verification.31

Discussion

I always encourage respectful discussion on my blog posts as responses to my Fediverse posts announcing those. Here is where you can interact with me on the topic: <https://woof.tech/@Frisk/117236169290829364>

Addeneum, why do I even careAddeneum, why do I even care

Why do I care

For some it might be useful to understand why this issue is important from my perspective.

Other than already stated goal of keeping this website running without applying self-censorship, I find the bulk of my opposition towards Age Verification come from the fact that I’m a gay furry with affection for fiction, including pornographic fiction.

I consider widely imposed Age Verification regulations to be extinction level events for many niche communities including those which I consider myself a participant of.

I’m in my twenties, to many it is a terrifying prospect, but the Internet in part raised me. For more than 10 years now I participate in wiki communities, for more than 10 years I consider myself a “furry”. I’ve found amazing creatures through those connections, they helped build my identity, my political ideology, helped shape my emotional maturity, helped to find my moral compass. They educated me on things that the conservative country I live in didn’t want me to know.

The Internet changed in my very eyes, and while I’m fully aware of how nostalgia affects our perception of reality, in many ways I miss the Internet when it wasn’t just a few big platforms with heavily standardized profiles that allow us or disallow us to express ourselves.

I look today at the political landscape shaping our world and see immense lobbying by Big Tech in Europe, I read a book about how tech giants hijacked Poland, how they circumvented laws and bypassed local government trying to regulate, how USA has basically forced their digital anti-circumvention laws upon everyone else using economic pressure.

I want Internet to be less cynical, more loving. I want regulations to reign in on Big Tech, to force them to stop recommending xenophobic content and conspiracy theories to my parent who has 0 media literacy experience and has no idea how to protect themselves from falsifications, misrepresentations and false narratives.

Finally, I want to exist. Myself, the weird me, all of it. I want to be able to share part of myself with others through this World Wide Web of ours. I want other weird creatures to be able to do the same. Age Verification is yet another roadblock standing there on a road to allow Internet to be Internet for all of us.

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1. The source is a little iffy I admit, but points to few interesting studies on the topic that are worth checking out <https://kidsplaytech.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/Panic%5FFirst%5FEvidence%5FLater.html> ↩︎ 2. ‘How Will Bans on Social Media Affect Children?’ Brookings, n.d. Accessed 8 September 2026. <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/how-will-bans-on-social-media-affect-children/>. ↩︎ 3. CNECT, European Commission-DG. ‘2 EUDI Wallet Functionalities - European Digital Identity’. Accessed 8 September 2026. <https://eu-digital-identity-wallet.github.io/eudi-doc-architecture-and-reference-framework/3.0.0/main/02-eudi-wallet-functionalities/>. ↩︎ 4. Barnett, Daly. ‘Zero-Knowledge Proofs Aren’t Age Verification Silver Bullets’. Electronic Frontier Foundation, 18 August 2026. Accessed 8 September 2026. <https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/08/zkps-arent-age-verification-silver-bullets>. ↩︎ 5. ‘Why the EU Age-Verification Tool Does Not Solve Privacy Concerns’. European Digital Rights (EDRi), n.d. Accessed 8 September 2026. <https://edri.org/our-work/eu-age-verification-tool-does-not-solve-privacy-concerns/>. ↩︎ 6. Mullvad VPN. ‘Age Verification for Social Media – the Beginning of the End for a Free Internet?’ 1 June 2026. <https://mullvad.net/en/blog/age-verification-for-social-media-the-beginning-of-the-end-for-a-free-internet>. ↩︎ 7. Do note that I do not share author’s generally upbeat framing of Age Verification implementation, but nonetheless I found the blog post informative and worthy of sharing. ↩︎ 8. .‘.EU Domain Registration Requirements - Domains - Namecheap.Com’. Accessed 8 September 2026. <https://www.namecheap.com/support/knowledgebase/article.aspx/247/36/eu-domain-registration-requirements/>. ↩︎ 9. ‘Discord Is Bringing Back Age Verification for Millions of Users’. Personal Tech. Gadget Review, 4 September 2026. <https://www.gadgetreview.com/discord-is-bringing-back-age-verification-for-millions-of-users>. ↩︎ 10. “AI Age Checks Are Here—And They’re Not Fair To Everyone.” Forbes. Last modified August 13, 2025. Accessed 8 September 2026. <https://www.forbes.com/sites/janicegassam/2025/08/13/ai-age-checks-are-here-and-theyre-not-fair-to-everyone/>. ↩︎ 11. Burgess, Matt. ‘When Face Recognition Doesn’t Know Your Face Is a Face’. Wired, 15 October 2025. Accessed 8 September 2026. <https://www.wired.com/story/when-face-recognition-doesnt-know-your-face-is-a-face/>. ↩︎ 12. Dellinger, A. J. ‘Britain’s Most Tattooed Man Says Age-Verification Law Preventing Him From Watching Porn’. Gizmodo, 1 August 2025. Accessed 8 September 2026. <https://gizmodo.com/britains-most-tattooed-man-says-age-verification-law-preventing-him-from-watching-porn-2000637909>. ↩︎ 13. A good Fediverse post on why those laws limit speech beyond pornography. Eepy Moe. ‘Shio (@shio)’. Accessed 8 September 2026. <https://eepy.moe/notes/aikep1nui5h20bvw>. ↩︎ 14. Povolny, Mariel. ‘Considering Age Verification and Impacts on LGBTQ+ Youth’. Tech Policy Press, 9 July 2024. Accessed 8 September 2026. <https://techpolicy.press/age-verification-and-lgbtq-youth>. ↩︎ 15. „International Technical Guidance on Sexuality Education. An Evidence-Informed Approach”. Accessed 8 September 2026. <https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/9789231002595>. ↩︎ 16. Buckley, Molly. ‘Age Verification Is A Windfall for Big Tech—And A Death Sentence For Smaller Platforms’. Electronic Frontier Foundation, 5 September 2025. Accessed 8 September 2026. <https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2025/09/age-verification-windfall-big-tech-and-death-sentence-smaller-platforms>. ↩︎ 17. (in Polish) EUpolicy.Social - ‘Panoptykon (@panoptykon@eupolicy.Social)’. 25 April 2025. Accessed 8 September 2026. <https://eupolicy.social/@panoptykon/114398322486562064>. ↩︎ 18. (in Polish) ‘Platformy (anty)społecznościowe od 15 lat? Trzeba to przegadać! | Fundacja Panoptykon’. 16 February 2026. <https://panoptykon.org/media-spolecznosciowe-od-15-lat>. ↩︎ 19. For what is worth, I believe position of Panoptykon on the topic has shifted slightly since and it is now focused on advocating for other methods of preventing harm to children in online spaces other than age-gates. ↩︎ 20. ‘Ageless Linux — State Law Tracker’. Accessed 8 September 2026. <https://agelesslinux.org/map.html>. ↩︎ 21. I recognize that China is often used as boogeyman with often misleading discourse on Social Credit System. That said, identity being a requirement to access many services is a real thing there and is closely tied with its government. ↩︎ 22. ‘Universal Declaration of Human Rights’. United Nations. Accessed 8 September 2026. <https://www.un.org/en/about-us/universal-declaration-of-human-rights>. ↩︎ 23. POLITICO. ‘Human Rights Chief Warns against Banning Social Media for Kids’. 24 March 2026. <https://www.politico.eu/article/michael-oflaherty-human-rights-council-of-europe-children-social-media-ban/>. ↩︎ 24. Milmo, Dan, and Dan Milmo Global technology editor. ‘French Court Blocks Macron’s Social Media Ban for under-15s’. World News. The Guardian, 14 August 2026. Accessed 8 September 2026. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/aug/14/french-court-blocks-macron-social-media-ban-under-15s>. ↩︎ 25. ‘Death Stranding Photo Mode Being Used to Bypass Age Verification’. Accessed 8 September 2026. <https://gamerant.com/death-stranding-photo-mode-bypass-age-verification/>. ↩︎ 26. Unseen Footages. A Man Looking Left and Right for Verification Dl. 2025. 0:14. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BA5a91WxmRs>. ↩︎ 27. I like the fact that it’s part of threat model for EU wallet application ↩︎ 28. ‘Four in Five Under-16s in Australia Using Social Media despite Ban, Study Shows | Social Media | The Guardian’. Accessed 8 September 2026. <https://www.theguardian.com/media/2026/jun/24/australia-under-16-social-media-ban-no-substantial-effects-study>. ↩︎ 29. Liu, Ting, Yanying Cheng, Yiming Luo, et al. ‘The Impact of Social Media on Children’s Mental Health: A Systematic Scoping Review’. Healthcare 12, no. 23 (2024): 2391. <https://doi.org/10.3390/healthcare12232391>. ↩︎ 30. Parents who are often overworked and with little time for their children, which may make this point sound overly harsh, but the problems we encounter here are structural and yes, there is an element of socioeconomics and economic classes. ↩︎ 31. Kolja, and Mark. Illegal Infrastructure: 12 Years of Hosting in the Greyzone. Accessed 8 September 2026. <https://media.ccc.de/v/38c3-illegal-infrastructure-12-years-of-hosting-in-the-greyzone>. ↩︎

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